維護管理者職位安全亦為管理者操縱盈餘之誘因。Gilson(1989)主張經理人在公司面臨財務困難時,將導致名譽受損、薪酬降低與職位異動等損失。Weisbach(1988)亦認為公司盈餘下降,將導致董事會更換管理者。因此,經理人有可能操縱盈餘,以掩飾公司財務困境,以避免遭受撤換。吾人可預期董事會更換管理者的機會愈高的公司,其管理者愈有可能操縱盈餘。然而會計績效是否能適切反應管理者的努力程度,Sloan(1993)持肯定的答案,因為會計績效能免於市場波動對管理者績效的影響,市場因素往往超出管理者所能掌控的範圍。然而,另一方面,相對市場報酬而言,管理者對會計政策的調整能力往往較於對股價的影響能力為高。只不過管理者利用應計項目進行跨期盈餘轉換的能力是有限制的(Chung, Firth & Kim, 2002)。
Aharony, Joseph, Chan-Jane Lin and Martin P. Loeb, 1993. Initial Public Offerings, Accounting Choices, and Earnings Management, Contemporary Accounting Research, 10 (1): 61-81.
Bushee, Brian J., 1998. The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R & D Investment Behavior, The Accounting Review, 73 (3): 305-333.
Byrd, John, Robert Parrino and Gunnar Pritsch, 1998. Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value, Financial Analysts Journal, 54 (3): 14-30.
Chung, Richard, Michael Firth and Jeong-Bon Kim, 2002. Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic Earnings Management, Journal of corporate finance, 8: 29-48.
Core, John E., Robert W. Holthausen and David. F. Larcker, 1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 51 (3): 371-406.
DeAngelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo and Douglas J. Skinner, 1994. Accounting Choice in Trouble Companies, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17: 113-143.
Dechow, Patricia M., Amy P. Hutton and Richard G. Sloan, 1996. Economic Consequences of Accounting for Stock-based Compensation, Journal of Accounting Research, 34: 1-20.
Dechow, Patricia M. and Douglas J. Skinner, 2000. Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and regulators, Accounting Horizons, 14 (2): 235-250.
Datar, Srikant M., Gerald A. Feltham and John S. Hughes, 1991. The Role of Audits and Audit Quality in Valuing New Issues, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14: 3-49.
Fu, Chung-Jen, 2001. Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Firm Performance, Sun Yat-Sen Management Review, 2001 International Issue: 95-116.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, 1995. A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents, The Journal of Political Economy, 103(1): 75-93.
Gilson, Stuart C., 1989. Management Turnover and Financial Distress, Journal of financial Economics, 25: 241-262.
Gul, Ferdinand A, Stephen G. Lynn and Judy S. Tsui, 2002. Audit Quality, Management Ownership, and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings, Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 17(1): 25-49.
Harvey, Keith D. and Ronald E. Shrieves, 2001. Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Governance Choices, The Journal of Financial Research, 24(4): 495-512.
Healy, Paul M., 1985. The Effects of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7: 85-107.
Healy, Paul M. and James M. Wahlen, 1999. A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting, Accounting Horizons, 13 (4): 365-383.
Hagerman, Robert L. and Mark E. Zmijewski, 1979. Some Economic Determinants of Accounting Policy Choice, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1: 141-161.
Hill, Charles W. L. and Scott A. Snell, 1989. Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate Productivity, Academy of Management Journal, 32 (1): 25-46.
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
John, Kose and Lemma W. Senbet, 1998. Corporate Governance and Board Effec-tiveness, Journal of Banking and Finance, 22: 371-403.
Kasznic, Ron, 1999. On the Association Between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management, Journal of Accounting Research, 37 (1): 57-81.
Maug, Ernst, 1998. Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?, The Journal of Finance, 53(1): 65-98.
McConnelln, John J. and Henri Servaes, 1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Owner-ship and Corporate Value, Journal of Financial Economics, 27: 595-612.
Mehran, Hamid, 1995. Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Perfor-mance, Journal of Financial Economics, 38: 163-184.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1988. Management Owner-ship and Market Valuation: an Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293-315.
Shleifer, Andrei. and Robert W. Vishny, 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 52(2): 737-783.
Sloan, Richard G., 1993. Accounting Earnings and Top Executive Compensation, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16: 55-100.
Teoh, Siew H., Ivo Welch and T. J. Wong, 1998. Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings, The Journal of Finance, 53 (6): 1935-1974.
Warfield, Terry D., John J. Wild and Kenneth L. Wild, 1995. Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices, and Informativeness of Earnings, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20: 61-91.
Watts, Ross L. and Jerold L. Zimmerman, 1978. Towards a Positive Theory of The Determination of Accounting Standards, The Accounting Review, 53 (1): 112-134.
Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 431-460.
Zmijewski, Mark E. and Robert L. Hagerman, 1981. An Income Strategy Approach to the Positive Theory of Accounting Standard Setting/Choice, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3: 129-149.